

THE MERGER
CONTROL
REVIEW

ELEVENTH EDITION

Editor
Ilene Knable Gotts

THE LAWREVIEWS

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PREFACE

Pre-merger competition review has advanced significantly since its creation in 1976 in the United States. As this book evidences, today almost all competition authorities have a notification process in place – with most requiring pre-merger notification for transactions that meet certain prescribed minimum thresholds. Additional jurisdictions, such as Malaysia, are currently considering imposing mandatory pre-notification regimes, and in the meantime can assert some jurisdiction to review certain transactions under their conduct laws and for specific sectors (e.g., aviation, communications). Also, the book includes chapters devoted to such ‘hot’ M&A sectors as pharmaceuticals, high technology and media, as well as a chapter on merger remedies, to provide a more in-depth discussion of recent developments. The intended readership of this book comprises both in-house and outside counsel who may be involved in the competition review of cross-border transactions.

Given the ability of most competition agencies with pre-merger notification laws to delay, and even block, a transaction, it is imperative to take each jurisdiction – small or large, new or mature – seriously. For instance, in 2009, China blocked the Coca-Cola Company’s proposed acquisition of China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited and imposed conditions on four mergers involving non-China-domiciled firms. In *Phonak/ReSound* (a merger between a Swiss undertaking and a Danish undertaking, each with a German subsidiary), the German Federal Cartel Office blocked the entire merger, even though less than 10 per cent of each of the undertakings was attributable to Germany. In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has effectively blocked transactions in which the parties question its authority. It is, therefore, imperative that counsel develop a comprehensive plan before, or immediately upon, execution of an agreement concerning where and when to file notification with competition authorities regarding such a transaction. To this end, this book provides an overview of the process in 30 jurisdictions, as well as a discussion of recent decisions, strategic considerations and likely upcoming developments.

Some common threads in institutional design underlie most of the merger review mandates, although there are some outliers as well as nuances that necessitate careful consideration when advising a client on a particular transaction. Almost all jurisdictions vest exclusive authority to review transactions in one agency. The United States is now the major exception in this regard since China consolidated its three antitrust agencies into one agency in 2018. Most jurisdictions provide for objective monetary size thresholds (e.g., the turnover of the parties, the size of the transaction) to determine whether a filing is required. Germany has amended its law to ensure that it has the opportunity to review transactions in which the parties’ turnovers do not reach the threshold, but the value of the transaction is significant (e.g., social media, new economy, internet transactions). The focus on ‘killer acquisitions’ (i.e., acquisitions by a dominant company of a nascent competitor), particularly

involving digital or platform offerings, has been a driver in the expansion of jurisdiction and focus of investigations. Some jurisdictions have adopted a process to 'call in' transactions that fall below the thresholds, but where the transaction may be of competitive significance. For instance, the Japan Federal Trade Commission (JFTC) has the ability of reviewing and taking action in non-reportable transactions, and has developed guidelines for voluntary filings. Note that the actual monetary threshold levels can vary in specific jurisdictions over time.

There are some jurisdictions that still use 'market share' indicia (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom). Most jurisdictions require that both parties have some turnover or nexus to their jurisdiction. However, there are some jurisdictions that take a more expansive view. For instance, in Poland, a notification may be required even though only one of the parties is present and, therefore, there may not be an impact on competition in Poland. Turkey recently issued a decision finding that a joint venture (JV) that produced no effect on Turkish markets was reportable because the JV's products 'could be' imported into Turkey. In Serbia, there is similarly no 'local' effect required. Germany also takes an expansive view by adopting as one of its thresholds a transaction of 'competitively significant influence'. Although a few merger notification jurisdictions remain 'voluntary' (e.g., in Australia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Venezuela), the vast majority impose mandatory notification requirements. Moreover, in Singapore, the transaction parties are to undertake a 'self-assessment' of whether the transaction will meet certain levels, and, if so, should notify the agency to avoid potential challenge by the agency.

Although in most jurisdictions the focus of the competition agency is on competition issues, some jurisdictions have a broader mandate. For instance, the 'public interest' approach in South Africa expressly provides for consideration of employment matters, local enterprises and procurement, and for economic empowerment of the black population and its participation in the company. Many of the remedies imposed in South Africa have been in connection with these considerations. Although a number of jurisdictions have separate regulations and processes for addressing foreign entity acquisitions when national security or specific industrial sectors are involved, in Romania, for example, competition law provides that the government can prohibit a merger if it determines that such merger could have a potential impact on national security.

Covid-19 and the current economic environment have provided new challenges to companies and enforcement agencies. Many jurisdictions have extended the review times to account for covid-19 disruptions at the agencies. At the same time, some of the transactions are distress situations, in which timing is key to avoid the exit of the operations and termination of employees. Regardless of the speed at which the economic recovery occurs, it is very likely that for the next couple of years the agencies will be faced with reviews of companies in financial distress, if not at the point of failure. Some jurisdictions exempt from notification (e.g., Ecuador) or have special rules for the timing of bankrupt firms (e.g., Brazil, Switzerland and the Netherlands where firms can implement before clearance if a waiver is obtained; Austria, India, Russia and the United States have shorter time frames). Also, in some jurisdictions, the law and precedent expressly recognise the consideration of the financial condition of the target and the failing firm doctrine (e.g., Canada, China and the United States). In Canada, for instance, the Competition Bureau explicitly permitted the *AIM/TMR* transaction to proceed on the basis of the failing company defence. Similarly, the Netherlands has recently recognised the defence in a couple of hospital mergers. In a major matter in the United Kingdom, *Amazon/Deliveroo*, the CMA provisionally allowed the

transaction to proceed due to the target being a failing firm. This topic is likely to be an area to watch in other jurisdictions, particularly in some of the newer merger regimes.

The potential consequences for failing to file in jurisdictions with mandatory requirements vary. Almost all jurisdictions require that the notification process be concluded before completion (e.g., pre-merger, suspensory regimes), rather than permitting the transaction to close as long as notification is made before closing. Many of these jurisdictions can impose a significant fine for failure to notify before closing, even where the transaction raises no competition concerns (e.g., Austria, Cyprus, India, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain and Turkey). In France, for instance, the competition authority imposed a €4 million fine on Castel Frères for failure to notify its acquisition of part of the Patriache group. In Ukraine and Romania, the competition authorities have focused their efforts on discovering consummated transactions that had not been notified, and imposing fines on the parties. Chile's antitrust enforcer recommended a fine of US\$3.8 million against two meat-packing companies, even though the parties had carved the Chilean business out of the closing.

Some jurisdictions impose strict time frames within which the parties must file their notification. For instance, Cyprus requires filing within one week of signing of the relevant documents and agreements; Serbia provides for 15 days after signing of the agreement; and Hungary, Ireland and Romania have a 30-calendar-day time limit for filing the notification that commences with entering into the agreement. Some jurisdictions that mandate filings within specified periods after execution of the agreement also have the authority to impose fines for 'late' notifications (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia and Serbia). Most jurisdictions also have the ability to impose significant fines for failure to notify or for closing before the end of the waiting period, or both (e.g., Austria, Canada, China, Greece, Portugal, Ukraine and the United States). In Macedonia, the failure to file can result in a misdemeanour and a monetary fine of up to 10 per cent of the worldwide turnover. In Belgium, the competition authority fined a party for late submission of information.

The United States and the European Commission (EC) both have a long history of focusing on interim conduct of the transaction parties, which is commonly referred to as 'gun-jumping', even fining companies that are found to be in violation. For example, the EC imposed the largest gun-jumping fine ever of €124.5 million against Altice. Other jurisdictions have more recently been aggressive. Brazil, for instance, issued its first gun-jumping fine in 2014 and recently issued guidelines on gun-jumping violations. Since then, Brazil has continued to be very active in investigating and imposing fines for gun-jumping activities. In addition, the sharing of competitively sensitive information before approval appears to be considered an element of gun-jumping. Also, for the first time, France imposed a fine of €20 million on the notifying party for failure to implement commitments fully within the time frame imposed by the authority.

In most jurisdictions, a transaction that does not meet the pre-merger notification thresholds is not subject to review or challenge by the competition authority. In Canada – like the United States – however, the Competition Bureau can challenge mergers that were not required to be notified under the pre-merger statute, as well as challenge notified transactions within the first year of closing. In Korea, Microsoft initially filed a notification with the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), but when it faced difficulties and delays in Korea, the parties restructured the acquisition to render the transaction non-reportable in Korea and consummated the transaction. The KFTC, however, continued its investigation as a post-consummation merger investigation and eventually obtained a consent order. In addition, the EC has fined companies on the basis that the information provided at the outset

was misleading (for instance, the EC fined Facebook €110 million for providing incorrect or misleading information during the *Facebook/WhatsApp* acquisition).

In almost all jurisdictions, very few transactions undergo a full investigation, although some require that the notification provide detailed information regarding the markets, competitors, competition, suppliers, customers and entry conditions. Most jurisdictions that have filing fees specify a flat fee or state in advance a schedule of fees based upon the size of the transaction; some jurisdictions, however, determine the fee after filing or provide different fees based on the complexity of the transaction. For instance, Cyprus is now considering charging a higher fee for acquisitions that are subjected to a full Phase II investigation.

Most jurisdictions more closely resemble the EC model than the United States model. In these jurisdictions, pre-filing consultations are more common (and even encouraged); parties can offer undertakings during the initial stage to resolve competitive concerns; and there is a set period during the second phase for providing additional information and for the agency to reach a decision. In Japan, however, the JFTC announced in June 2011 that it would abolish the prior consultation procedure option. When combined with the inability to 'stop the clock' on the review periods, counsel may find it more challenging in transactions involving multiple filings to avoid the potential for the entry of conflicting remedies or even a prohibition decision at the end of a JFTC review. Some jurisdictions, such as Croatia, are still aligning their threshold criteria and processes with the EC model. Even within the EC, there remain some jurisdictions that differ procedurally from the EC model. For instance, in Austria, the obligation to file can be triggered if only one of the involved undertakings has sales in Austria, as long as both parties satisfy a minimum global turnover and have a sizeable combined turnover in Austria.

The role of third parties also varies across jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions (e.g., Japan), there is no explicit right of intervention by third parties, but the authorities can choose to allow it on a case-by-case basis. In contrast, in South Africa, registered trade unions or representatives of employees must be provided with a redacted copy of the merger notification from the outset and have the right to participate in merger hearings before the Competition Tribunal: the Tribunal will typically also permit other third parties to participate. Bulgaria has announced a process by which transaction parties even consent to disclosure of their confidential information to third parties. In some jurisdictions (e.g., Australia, the EC and Germany), third parties may file an objection to a clearance decision. In some jurisdictions (including Canada, the EC and the United States), third parties (e.g., competitors) are required to provide information and data if requested by the antitrust authority. In Israel, a third party that did not comply with such a request was recently fined by the antitrust authority.

In almost all jurisdictions, once the authority approves the transaction, it cannot later challenge the transaction's legality. The United States is one significant outlier with no bar for subsequent challenge, even decades following the closing, if the transaction is later believed to have substantially lessened competition. Canada, in contrast, provides a more limited time period of one year for challenging a notified transaction (see the recent *CSC/Complete* transaction). Norway is a bit unusual, where the authority has the ability to mandate notification of a transaction for a period of up to three months following the transaction's consummation. In 'voluntary' jurisdictions, such as Australia and Singapore, the competition agency can investigate and challenge unnotified transactions.

It is becoming the norm, in large cross-border transactions raising competition concerns, for the US, Canadian, Mexican and EC authorities to work closely together during the investigative stages, and even in determining remedies, minimising the potential

of arriving at diverging outcomes. The KFTC has stated that it will engage in even greater cooperation with foreign competition authorities, particularly those of China and Japan, which are similar to Korea in their industrial structure. Regional cooperation among some of the newer agencies has also become more common; for example, the Argentinian authority has worked with Brazil's competition authority, which, in turn, has worked with the Chilean authority. Competition authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey similarly maintain close ties and cooperate on transactions. Taiwan is part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which shares a database. In transactions not requiring filings in multiple European jurisdictions, Member States often keep each other informed during the course of an investigation. In addition, transactions not meeting the EC threshold can nevertheless be referred to the EC in appropriate circumstances. The United States has signed cooperation agreements with a number of jurisdictions, including, most recently, Peru and India. China has 'consulted' with the United States and the EC on some mergers and entered into a cooperation agreement with the United States authorities in 2011.

The impact of such multi-jurisdictional cooperation is very evident. For instance, the transaction parties in *Applied Materials/Tokyo Electron* ultimately abandoned the transaction following the combined objections of several jurisdictions, including the United States, Europe and Korea. In *Office Depot/Staples*, the FTC and the Canadian Competition Bureau cooperated and both jurisdictions brought suits to block the transaction (although the EC had also cooperated on this transaction, it ultimately accepted the undertakings offered by the parties). In the *GE/Alstom* transaction, the United States and the EC coordinated throughout, including at the remedies stage. Additionally, in the *Halliburton/Baker Hughes* transaction, the United States and the EC coordinated their investigations, with the United States suing to block the transaction while the EC's investigation continued. Also, in *Holcim/Lafarge*, the cooperation between the United States and Canada continued at the remedies stage, where both consents included assets in the other jurisdiction's territory. The United States, Canada and Mexico coordinated closely in the review of the *Continental/Veyance* transaction. In fact, coordination among the jurisdictions in multinational transactions that raise competition issues is becoming the norm.

Although some jurisdictions have recently raised the size threshold at which filings are mandated, others have broadened the scope of their legislation to include, for instance, partial ownership interests. Some jurisdictions continue to have as their threshold test for pre-merger notification whether there is an 'acquisition of control'. Many of these jurisdictions, however, will include, as a reportable situation, the creation of 'joint control', 'negative (e.g., veto control' rights to the extent that they may give rise to *de jure* or *de facto* control (e.g., Turkey), or a change from 'joint control' to 'sole control' (e.g., the EC and Lithuania). Minority holdings and concerns over 'creeping acquisitions', in which an industry may consolidate before the agencies become fully aware, have become the focus of many jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions will consider as reviewable acquisitions in which only a 10 per cent or less interest is being acquired (e.g., Serbia for certain financial and insurance mergers), although most jurisdictions have somewhat higher thresholds (e.g., Korea sets the threshold at 15 per cent of a public company and otherwise at 20 per cent of a target; and Japan and Russia at any amount exceeding 20 per cent of the target). Others use, as the benchmark, the impact that the partial shareholding has on competition; Norway, for instance, can challenge a minority shareholding that creates or strengthens a significant restriction on competition. The United Kingdom also focuses on whether the minority shareholder has 'material influence' (i.e., the

ability to make or influence commercial policy) over the entity. Several agencies during the past few years have analysed partial ownership acquisitions on a stand-alone basis as well as in connection with JVs (e.g., Canada, China, Cyprus, Finland and Switzerland). Vertical mergers were also a subject of review (and even resulted in some enforcement actions) in a number of jurisdictions (e.g., Belgium, Canada, China, Sweden and Taiwan). Portugal even viewed as an ‘acquisition’ subject to notification the non-binding transfer of a customer base.

For transactions that raise competition issues, the need to plan and to coordinate among counsel has become particularly acute. Multi-jurisdictional cooperation facilitates the development of cross-border remedies packages that effectively address competitive concerns while permitting the transaction to proceed. The consents adopted by the United States and Canada in the *Holcim/Lafarge* merger exemplify such a cross-border package. As discussed in the ‘International Merger Remedies’ chapter, it is no longer prudent to focus merely on the larger mature authorities, with the expectation that other jurisdictions will follow their lead or defer to their review. In the current enforcement environment, obtaining the approval of jurisdictions such as Brazil and China can be as important as the approval of the EC or the United States. Moreover, the need to coordinate is particularly acute, to the extent that multiple agencies decide to impose conditions on the transaction. Although most jurisdictions indicate that ‘structural’ remedies are preferable to ‘behavioural’ conditions, a number of jurisdictions in the past few years have imposed a variety of such behavioural remedies (e.g., China, the EC, France, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Ukraine and the United States). For instance, some recent decisions have included as behavioural remedies pricing, sales tariffs and terms of sale conditions (e.g., Korea, Ukraine and Serbia), employee retrenchment (South Africa) and restrictions on bringing anti-dumping suits (e.g., Mexico). Many recent decisions have imposed behavioural remedies to strengthen the effectiveness of divestitures (e.g., Canada’s decision in the *Loblaw/Shoppers* transaction, China’s MOFCOM remedy in *Glencore/Xstrata* and France’s decision in the *Numericable/SFR* transaction). This book should provide a useful starting point in navigating cross-border transactions in the current enforcement environment.

Ilene Knable Gotts

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

New York

July 2020

Part II

JURISDICTIONS

SPAIN

*Pedro Callol*¹

I INTRODUCTION

i Regulations

The merger control regime is regulated by the Competition Act² and its implementing regulation³ and interpretative guidelines.

ii Authorities

The national competition authority is the National Competition and Markets Commission (CNMC). The CNMC was created in 2013 bringing together under a single roof the pre-existing National Competition Commission and various national sector regulatory authorities (energy, telecommunications and media, railways, postal, airports). This had an impact over mergers in regulated sectors, hitherto subject to the need for a cross-report from the relevant regulatory authority. The creation of the CNMC eliminated the need for cross-reports from regulators in industry sectors that are now dealt with by the CNMC. Hence, the CNMC modified its Notice on Short Form Merger Filings in October 2015, to eliminate the rule that short-form merger filings were not available when a cross-report from the competent regulatory authority was required. Reduced form filings are now also possible in industry sectors where the CNMC has authority (although standard merger filing forms will still be required in industry sectors where the CNMC has no authority, such as banking mergers).⁴

The CNMC has a dual structure, which reflects on its regulatory and competition enforcement rules. A collegiate body, the Council, is the decision-making organ of the CNMC. The Council has 10 members divided into two chambers of five members each, one chamber dealing with competition matters and presided over by the president of the CNMC; the other dealing with regulatory supervision and led by the vice president. The chambers may meet separately or jointly in a plenary session. The president has the deciding vote in the case of a tied vote at the Council.

In the area of merger control, the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) has a role in problematic mergers where the CNMC either considers prohibition or submission to conditions. This role of the Council of Ministers is further described below.

Appointment of the CNMC Council members, including the president and vice president, is entrusted to the government upon proposal of the Ministry of Economy.

1 Pedro Callol is a partner at Callol, Coca & Asociados.

2 Law 15/2007 of 3 July 2007 on Competition.

3 Royal Decree 261/2008 of 22 February 2008, approving the Competition Implementing Regulation.

4 CNMC Notice of 21 October 2015 on cases where the short-form filings may be used.

CNMC Council members are appointed for non-renewable terms of six years. Renewal of various Council members, including the president, who is acting on a prorogued mandate, is still due at the time of writing.

The bulk of the CNMC is made up of the various directorates, which deal with the investigations and provide the substantial back office research and knowledge required for the day-to-day work of the CNMC. The Competition Directorate deals with the enforcement of competition law and is, in turn, divided into various sub-directorates of industry and energy, information society, services, leniency and cartels and, finally, a monitoring sub-directorate. There is no specific merger task force, which means that mergers are allocated internally. The Competition Directorate is a professional office with career civil servants who act impartially and with a business-like attitude when addressing companies' issues.

iii Pre-merger notification and approval

Which transactions qualify as a merger?

A concentration takes place when a stable change of control of an undertaking takes place as a result of a merger of two previously independent undertakings; an acquisition of control of an undertaking or a part thereof by another undertaking; or the creation of a joint venture or the acquisition of joint control of an undertaking, provided the joint venture is full-function and performs its economic activity on a long-term basis.

An acquisition of control results from contracts, rights or any other means that, taking into account the circumstances of fact and law, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence over the acquired undertaking. The concept of control encompasses ownership of shares or assets, contracts, rights or other means that provide decisive influence over the composition, deliberations or decisions of the governing organs of the company.

Purely internal restructurings within a company group do not constitute a change of control. Likewise, the acquisition of control must involve a business having access to the market and therefore a business to which a market share or market turnover can be assigned. Hence an acquisition of a business previously providing an internal service solely to the selling group will not amount to a merger, provided that no sales from the acquired business take place to third parties within a start-up period from the acquisition (start-up period of generally three years). Temporary shareholdings by financial entities, holding companies and receiverships are excluded in the circumstances described by the Competition Act. Shifting alliances have, in some instances, received a particular treatment in Spain, distinct from what could generally be acceptable under EU law and the European Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice.

Thresholds triggering merger control in Spain

The Competition Act provides that concentrations that meet either one of the following thresholds must be notified to the CNMC for merger control purposes:

- a* that, as a result of the concentration, a market share of 30 per cent or more of the relevant product market in Spain, or a relevant geographic market within Spain, is acquired or increased. A *de minimis* exemption applies if:
- the turnover of the acquired undertaking in Spain does not exceed €10 million; and
 - the concentration does not lead to acquiring or increasing a market share of 50 per cent or higher in the relevant product or service market or in any other market affected by the concentration; or

- b that the aggregated turnover in Spain of the parties to the concentration exceeds €240 million in the previous accounting year, if at least two of the parties to the concentration each have an individual turnover exceeding €60 million in Spain.

If either one of the above thresholds is met, filing is mandatory and the concentration cannot be implemented prior to having been authorised. The Competition Act provides for a derogation system that enables total or partial closing of a merger prior to having gained merger control clearance. This is further discussed in Section III.

In our experience, the market share threshold poses some practical questions; for instance, the market share threshold can be met if the target company alone has a 30 per cent (or 50 per cent, as the case may be) share in a relevant market, even if the acquirer has a zero per cent market share, although this would be a candidate for a short-form merger filing and quick review. Market definition must be carried out on the basis of existing merger control practice and precedents persuasive in Spain, including those of the CNMC. Generally, the market share threshold need not be problematic; it can be dealt with expediently and in a constructive fashion.

Consequences of failing to notify a reportable transaction

Closing a transaction without having obtained the required merger control approval is a serious infringement under the Competition Act. The CNMC actively monitors gun-jumping, including that of transactions that had to be reported pursuant to the market share threshold, which the CNMC has shown it has will to enforce (with the majority of gun-jumping investigations being triggered by the market share threshold). Closing a reportable transaction without having gained merger control approval may carry fines of up to 5 per cent of the turnover of the acquiring group.⁵ Closing in contravention of the terms of a merger control decision may result in fines of up to 10 per cent of turnover. Fines are imposed following a separate administrative investigation on gun-jumping. Furthermore, companies condemned for gun-jumping may potentially be disqualified from supplying goods and services to public administrations under the public procurement laws.

Filing fee

A filing fee must be paid and proof of payment included as part of the merger filing. The amount of the fee is determined in an Annex to Law 3/2013 of 4 June 2013 on the creation of the CNMC. The amount of the fee may be updated annually and is currently as follows:

- a €5,502.15 when the aggregate turnover of the merging parties is equal to or less than €240 million;
- b €11,004.31 when the aggregate turnover of the merging parties is between €240 million and €480 million;
- c €22,008.62 when the aggregate turnover of the merging parties is between €240 million and €3 billion; and

5 In some cases, worldwide turnover of the infringing group has been used as a basis for the calculation of the fine (Decision of 26 January 2010, *Abertis/Inarlia*, SNC/0003/09). Also, occasionally turnover of both acquirer and target are taken into account for the calculation of the fine (Decision of 22 July 2011, *Dorff Ketal*, file SNC 0009/11).

- d* a fixed amount of €43,944 when the aggregate turnover of the merging parties is above €3 billion, adding €11,004.31 to the fee for each additional €3 billion of aggregate turnover of the parties, up to a maximum fee amount of €109,906.

The filing fee for short-form filings is currently €1,545.45.

II YEAR IN REVIEW

Although more active than in some previous years in terms of deal flow, 2019 has been a rather standard year in merger review terms, with two transactions having been subjected to Phase II proceedings. Conversely, we have seen some innovative and interesting Phase I reviews in exciting sectors, including some transactions in the ‘new’ economy. In addition, the CNMC has been quite proactive in approving merger transactions, even highly problematic ones, in Phase I, when necessary, subject to commitments. The CNMC has also increased its track record of clearing easy transactions well ahead of the Phase I deadline, sometimes in a matter of a few days.

Overall, roughly 89 concentrations were subject to merger control in 2019⁶ in all sectors including online platforms for managing food orders at home, healthcare, manufacture and sale of white cement, the private gaming sector and telecommunications. We set out below some significant merger cases.

i Quirón/Clinica Santa Cristina merger

This matter concerns the acquisition of Clinic Santa Cristina’s healthcare business in Albacete by Helios Healthcare Spain SLU (Quirón Group).⁷ There are only two private hospitals with in-patient care in Albacete: Quirónsalud Albacete, run by Quirón Group, and Health Clinic Santa Cristina, the target in this transaction.

As a result of the acquisition, the only private healthcare competitor in the province of Albacete would disappear. Consequently, Quirón Group would have an unbeatable competitive position, as already confirmed by the market tests applied by the CNMC during Phase I proceedings. Additionally, the market power acquired in the delivery of in-patient healthcare services could reinforce the position of the resulting operator in the delivery of outpatient services. This situation could arise from the fact that patients tend to prefer the whole medical process to be carried out in the same healthcare centre.

The unilateral effects of the merger were compounded by economic, technical and legal barriers to entry, effectively hindering the deployment of new private hospitals in the province of Albacete, at least in the short term.

On the basis of the above, the CNMC considered that an in-depth analysis of the notified operation was necessary, in view of the possible obstacles to the maintenance of effective competition in the market under consideration. Consequently, the Competition Directorate referred the file for Phase II consideration. In Phase II, the concentration was approved subject to a remedy package to safeguard the clinical speciality treatment portfolio

⁶ At the time of writing, the CNMC had not yet published its review of activities for 2019.

⁷ Decision of 16 April 2019, *Quirón/Clinica Santa Cristina*, file C/0966/18.

and guarantee the supply of healthcare services to all patients at stable prices and quality levels. In particular, the CNMC drew up a statement of facts that identified three potential competition problems:

- a* commitments were submitted seeking to avoid a reduction in service quality and to ensure the continuation of existing collaboration with public health systems;
- b* to guarantee the continued collaboration with the public health system, Quirón agreed to provide the Health Service of Castilla-La Mancha the same portfolio of services it currently provides; and committed not to close certain specialities, including those not provided by the public hospital of Albacete and not to lower the quality of care indicators for patients referred from the public health system; and
- c* finally, regarding the risk that the market would be closed off to other real or potential competitors, Quirón agreed to maintain the legal relationships with those health professionals who were already providing their services in competing hospitals and to guarantee access to the medical professionals who were renting spaces in Quirón.

ii Acquisition of GGSO by CIRSA

These parties overlapped in the private gaming sector, in particular in off-line gaming offerings in the regions of Cataluña, Valencia and Aragon.⁸ High market shares were identified in Cataluña specifically, for the management of type B machines in food and drink establishments, as well as in arcades and bingo halls. Conditional clearance was granted on condition of eliminating the exclusivity clauses in all contracts signed by the merged entity in Cataluña to enhance competition between the operators of gaming machines within premises. In addition, Cirsa committed to limit the duration of contracts to five years in both food and drink establishments and arcades. Finally, Cirsa committed to close two bingo halls in Barcelona, making those licences available to new entrants.

iii Lyntia's purchase of usage rights for the excess dark fibre network of Iberdrola

This transaction involves Lyntia's acquisition of the right to use the excess capacity of the fibre optic network over which Iberdrola Spain, Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica and Iberdrola Generación (Iberdrola) have exclusive, long-term ownership or usage rights.⁹ In addition, Lyntia is acquiring Iberdrola's portfolio of contracts with fibre optic clients.

Iberdrola markets wholesale telecommunications services using fibre optic networks deployed for its own electricity distribution and transmission infrastructure and in networks deployed by third parties, for which it has usage rights. The dark fibre market in Spain is very concentrated (the two main operators, Reintel and Lyntia, account for over 90 per cent of the market) and there are significant barriers to entry.

As a result, the transaction was approved subject to commitments to alleviate the vertical effects (foreclosure) of the merger. Lyntia will not unreasonably terminate existing contracts and will offer to extend existing contracts expiring within 10 years. Likewise, it will offer access, under reasonable conditions and via the different existing commercial methods, to its entire dark fibre network in Spain for a period of five years.

8 Decision of 30 July 2019, *CIRSA/GGSO*, file C/1035/19.

9 Decision of 30 July 2019, *Lyntia/Activos Iberdrola*, file C/1031/19.

iv Merger of Just Eat and Canary

Both parties are online platforms for managing home food orders. However, while Just Eat operates nationally, Canary only has a presence in the Canary Islands.

This is a good example of a merger in a two-sided market.¹⁰ In this case, one obvious issue would be if the resulting platform has many exclusives with restaurants, as this can make it difficult for new operators to enter the market.

The operation strengthened Just Eat, particularly in Las Palmas de Gran Canaria where it would lead the market. However, the CNMC did not expect there to be competition problems for several reasons. First, Canary has been operating in this market for years without any significant innovations compared to other platforms, so this is not an acquisition that would eliminate a new, innovative and thriving competitor. Second, the acquired company is small. Third, the market for such platforms is dynamic, and new companies such as Glovo and Uber Eats have recently entered the market and have achieved significant market shares in a short period of time. Finally, the entry of these new competitors coincided with the commitments that the CNMC approved when it authorised the *Just Eat/La Nevera Roja* merger.¹¹ The latter commitments (the duration of which is confidential according to the merger decision, but which applies nationally, including within the Canary Islands) were focused on Just Eat's undertaking not to bind restaurants exclusively.

v Merger of MIH Food Delivery Holdings and Just Eat

The CNMC cleared the acquisition with commitments by MIH Food Delivery Holdings, BV (MIH) of Just Eat plc (Just Eat) through a hostile takeover bid.¹² The combination would impact the handling of online platforms for managing food orders at home, which are accessed via internet or mobile applications. The market is relatively concentrated and demand is expected to continue growing at significant rates in coming years.

The CNMC analysed the implications of MIH's minority interest (less than 25 per cent) in Delivery Hero and the stake that Delivery Hero has in Glovo (less than 20 per cent). This would result in the buyer of Just Eat having an indirect minority interest in its main competitor in Spain, Glovo. These interests could facilitate MIH's access to information related to Glovo's strategic commercial policy, since directly or indirectly (through Delivery Hero), MIH would have access to the information made available to the board of directors of Just Eat and Glovo, respectively. Likewise, the indirect presence of MIH on the board of directors of the main competitor of Just Eat enables interference in this competitor's business.

Consequently, the transaction was subject to commitments seeking to: (1) guarantee that MIH cannot have access to Delivery Hero or Glovo's sensitive commercial information; (2) prevent MIH from influencing Glovo's strategy in competition with Just Eat in Spain; and (3) prohibit Delivery Hero (and, therefore, Glovo) from accessing Just Eat's sensitive business information.

Cross-ownership restrictions in competing companies are in place in Spain in some concentrated or sensitive industries, such as telecommunications, energy and media.

10 Decision of 10 September 2019, *Just Eat/Canary*, file C/1046/19.

11 Decision of 31 March 2016, *Just Eat/La Nevera Roja*, file C/0730/16.

12 Decision of 5 December 2019, *MIH Food Delivery Holdings/Just Eat*, file C/1072/19.

III THE MERGER CONTROL REGIME

i **Waiting periods and time frames**

Pre-notification is customary and is advised when possible. Pre-notification is not subject to statutory deadlines. In most cases, two or three weeks should be allowed, although it can take longer if the transaction is complex from a competitive standpoint, or if the CNMC requires additional information to be included in the notification form.

The formal merger control investigation is divided into Phase I and Phase II proceedings. The majority of files are cleared in Phase I, whereas only a fraction are referred to Phase II in-depth analysis.

Phase I proceedings last in principle for one month, counted from the date a complete notification is filed with the CNMC. Where the notifying party submits commitments (this possibility exists during the 20-day period after the filing), the Phase I statutory maximum period is extended by 10 additional days.

The maximum period for Phase II proceedings is two months, counted from the date the CNMC decides to open a Phase II review. The maximum period is extended for 15 additional days if commitments are submitted in Phase II (the notifying party can offer commitments up to 35 days after the start of Phase II proceedings).

In the event of Phase II decisions blocking or imposing obligations, the Minister of Economy is entitled to refer the case to the Council of Ministers within 15 days of the Phase II decision being issued. If referred to it, the Council of Ministers has one month to issue a final decision, which may confirm the Phase II CNMC decision or may authorise the merger, with or without conditions.

All maximum periods can be interrupted by the CNMC in regulated events such as formal information requests.

Due to the covid-19 situation, administrative periods and timelines, including for merger control, are on pause at the time of writing. However, the CNMC has, until recently, been dealing with pre-notifications and meeting merger review deadlines.

ii **Parties' ability to accelerate the review procedure, tender offers and hostile transactions**

As discussed, pre-notification in practice normally makes the review easier.

The merger cannot be closed prior to having gained the prerequisite merger clearance. It is possible to request a derogation from the suspension effect of the merger filing. This derogation is nowadays very rarely granted. In the past, the exception has been used in limited instances to enable quick closing of a merger in non-problematic geographic areas, while enabling a Phase II review limited to problematic areas (for instance in supermarket, gas station and other mergers with local geographic markets). As a general rule, the CNMC in practice has a preference not to use this derogation procedure, as it entails considerable analysis; rather, where possible, the CNMC prefers to move towards quick merger clearance if the circumstances merit it.

Public offers can be launched including as condition for the validity the merger control clearance. The Competition Act enables launching of a public tender without having gained merger control provided that the CNMC is notified the merger within five days from the formal application for authorisation of the public tender with the Securities Exchange Commission; and that the voting rights are not exercised save when required to preserve the value of an investment, with the authorisation of the CNMC.

Hostile public offers are rare in Spain. Past experience shows that hostile takeovers, particularly in strategic sectors, can be extremely complex. The hostile bid for Endesa launched by Gas Natural in the prior decade was not successful, and competing offers required intervention from the European Commission under Article 21 of the EC Merger Regulation. On that same transaction, the initial merger control authorisation gained by the first bidder (Gas Natural) was frozen by the Supreme Court on interim review.

iii Third-party access to the file and rights to challenge mergers

Third-party access is expressly contemplated in the Competition Act in Phase II merger proceedings. Parties with a legitimate interest have the possibility to access the merger file and submit comments to the statement of objections and proposed commitments. These are normal dynamics in Phase II, where third parties have a relevant role and provide input that help shape the outcome of the merger proceedings.

The law does not foresee the possibility that interested parties have a role in Phase I. Phase I proceedings are confidential and the file cannot be accessed by third parties. However, as there is no express provision banning participation of third parties in Phase I merger proceedings, it is accepted, and has become quite standard, that third parties make representations and submissions to the CNMC regarding a merger also during Phase I merger proceedings. An example of this is the *Helios/Quiron* merger,¹³ where the participation of a third party in the proceedings was expressly discussed in the merger decision.

Indeed, the CNMC will listen to third parties concerns and if these have merit, the CNMC should be expected to raise the level of scrutiny of a given merger.

Third parties also play a role in reporting mergers that should have been filed for merger review but were not.¹⁴

iv Resolution of authorities' competition concerns, appeals and judicial review

The CNMC should, at least in theory, solve most initial concerns in pre-notification. The CNMC will make use of formal information requests, stopping the clock when necessary. Once the proposed transaction has been formally filed, the CNMC may be keen, depending on the circumstances, to deal with any questions informally, without stopping the clock (particularly if the transaction has been pre-notified).

Merger decisions by the CNMC may be appealed within two months before the High Court. In instances where the Council of Ministers decides on the merger, the Supreme Court is competent to review the merger decision.

v Effect of regulatory review

Mergers reviewed by the CNMC may be reviewed concurrently by other administrative agencies dealing, for instance, with regulatory and licensing issues. The potential friction and lack of coordination between the CNMC and sector regulators has been minimised in some instances in economic sectors where the CNMC also acts as a regulatory authority. In areas such as banking, where the regulator is not within the CNMC, merger review is suspended while the sector regulator completes its review.

13 Decision of 22 December 2016, *Helios/Quironsalud*, file C/0813/16.

14 For example, Decision of 29 July 2010, *Bergé/Marítima Candina*, file R/0006/10.

IV OTHER STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Generally speaking, it is far better to pre-notify transactions if at all possible. The CNMC has in the past recommended pre-notification and it clearly does not like that transactions are notified for merger control without pre-notification. Furthermore, pre-notification enables discussion on a preliminary basis on many strategic issues, including the recurrent usage of the short-form filing, occasionally even in situations not expressly foreseen by the applicable regulation.

Another benefit of pre-notification is expected timing for approval. Even though initially pre-notification implies additional delay, in practice the CNMC will reduce the time dedicated to the review and often issue speedier approval if pre-notification has taken place. In non-problematic cases, recent experience shows that the CNMC often grants approval in 10 to 20 days from filing.

It is possible to apply for formal guidance from the CNMC regarding whether or not a change of control arises as a result of the projected merger and the merger thresholds are met. One issue here is the lack of a binding deadline for the CNMC to act on a request for formal guidance, an area that might change in the future.

Merger control is an important tool and the CNMC has, in the past, vigorously investigated and pursued gun-jumping or closing of reportable transactions without having obtained the necessary merger clearance. The CNMC has recently made it clear that it is ready to use its powers to punish individual directors and managers for competition breaches (which has hitherto not materialised in any actual fines to individuals in situations of gun-jumping, a situation that may change). Likewise, new legislation that entered into force recently arguably makes it possible to exclude from public tender those companies that have been condemned for gun-jumping. Specifically, the CNMC has initiated proceedings against Nufri, Sociedad Agraria de Transformación for having closed the acquisition of Grupo Idulleida before gaining merger clearance.¹⁵

V OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSIONS

The current CNMC is the result of the integration of Spain's main national regulatory authorities in various network industries and regulated sectors into the Competition Authority in 2013 (see Section I). The integration was criticised at the time. In the medium to longer term, it cannot be ruled out that a future legal reform will again separate the national regulatory authorities from the Competition Authority. This possibility has been discussed, although there does not currently appear to be momentum for it.

The CNMC is well aware that the formal guidance procedure enabling it to give clarity on the reportability of a merger is impaired by the lack of a binding deadline. This may perhaps change by dealing with the matter in the new legislation that will possibly be introduced to revert to the previous model of separation between competition enforcer and sector regulators.

The current economic crisis has triggered considerable financial difficulty for many companies in a country where tourism and transportation-related activities are very important to the economy. In this regard, the failing firm defence is acknowledged and used by the CNMC and may well apply to concentrations in the current circumstances, provided it can

¹⁵ Decision of 28 November 2019, *Grupo Nufri*, file SNC/DC/093/19.

be appropriately substantiated and evidenced. In the past, the CNMC has invoked the failing firm defence in restrictive circumstances only, and has avoided its use in temporary crisis situations (e.g., the *Antena 3/La Sexta* merger).¹⁶

Another area that overlaps with merger control, and that is directly related to concentrations, is that of foreign direct investment (FDI) screening. In April 2020, the government introduced a new FDI screening regime, which is very broad in scope and which, like merger control, requires clearance prior to the closing of an acquisition, under penalty of fines of up to the consideration of the transaction. At the time of writing, this regime poses serious issues of interpretation, pending the approval of an implementing regulation, so careful advice may be required.

In conclusion, no radical changes are, in principle, to be expected in the merger control arena in Spain, with the qualification of the limited changes likely to arise (primarily but perhaps not exclusively) at the institutional enforcement level if the CNMC goes back to its previous form (with the competition and regulatory authorities separated again). The CNMC or its successor is likely to continue to enforce competition policy vigorously, including merger control laws. Going forward it cannot be ruled out, perhaps, that the CNMC will include individuals in fines for gun-jumping, in line with what is the trend in antitrust enforcement cases, and may also increase the amount of fines, in line with what seems to be a trend at European Commission level and in neighbouring countries such as France.

16 Decision of 13 July 2012, *Antena 3/La Sexta*, file C/0432/12.

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